back to http://www.ironmyvote.com

Hillary's 2002 Iraq Vote

Hillary was NOT voting "for war" but for diplomacy 

Short Overview -- an excerpt from an article by the conservative David Brooks

Hillary's statement at the CA debate

Link to the full text of the AUMF resolution

Hillary's speech at the time of the AUMF debate

HIllary attempted to limit the power of the AUMF

Long Overview -- longer from the  article by David Brooks

Link to transcript of CA debate


Obama was NOT a lonely voice against the resolution:

Eight of the 10 Illinois Dems in the U.S. House voted No on the resolution. Sen. Dick Durbin of Illinois also opposed the resolution authorizing the use of force.


Short Overview -- an excerpt from an article by the conservative David Brooks

Here is a conservative defending Hillary's vote and giving more explanation of what she and others thought they were voting for:
http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/article/view/?id=1336 
No Apology Needed
New York Times
David Brooks
<I>The Iraq war debate began in earnest in September 2002. At that point Clinton was saying in public what Colin Powell was saying in private: emphasizing the need to work through the U.N. and build a broad coalition to enforce inspections.
She delivered her Senate resolution speech on Oct. 10. It was Clintonian in character. On the one hand, she rejected the Bush policy of pre-emptive war. On the other hand, she also rejected the view that the international community "should only resort to force if and when the United Nations Security Council approves it." Drawing on the lessons of Bosnia, she said sometimes the world had to act, even if the big powers couldn't agree.
She sought a third way: more U.N. resolutions, more inspections, more diplomacy, with the threat of force reserved as a last resort. She was triangulating, but the Senate resolution offered her a binary choice. She voted yes in order to give Powell bipartisan leverage at the U.N.
This is how she's always explained that vote, and I confess that until now, I've regarded her explanation as a transparent political dodge. Didn't everyone know this was a war resolution? But now, having investigated her public comments, I think diplomatic leverage really was on her mind. I also know, from a third person, that she was spending a lot of time with Powell and wanted to help.
....
When you look back at Clinton's thinking, you don't see a classic war supporter. You see a person who was trying to seek balance between opposing arguments. You also see a person who deferred to the office of the presidency. You see a person who, as president, would be fox to Bush's hedgehog: who would see problems in their complexities rather than in their essentials; who would elevate procedural concerns over philosophical ones; who would postpone decision points for as long as possible; and who would make distinctions few heed.</I>


Hillary's statement at the California debate 

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/01/the_california_democratic_deba.html
BLITZER: Senator Clinton, you always say if you knew then what you know now, you wouldn't have voted like that. But why can't you just say right now that that vote was a mistake?

CLINTON: Well, Wolf, I think that if you look at what was going on at the time, and certainly I did an enormous amount of investigation and due diligence to try to determine what, if any, threat could flow from the history of Saddam Hussein being both an owner of and a seeker of weapons of mass destruction.

The idea of putting inspectors back in, that -- that was a credible idea. I believe in coercive diplomacy. I think that you try to figure out how to move bad actors in a direction that you'd prefer in order to avoid more dire consequences. And what -- if you took it on the face of it and if you took it on the basis of what we hope would happen with the inspectors going in, that in and of itself was a policy that we've used before. We have used the threat of force to try to make somebody try to change their behavior.

I think what no one could have fully appreciated is how obsessed this president was with this particular mission. And unfortunately, I and others who warned at the time, who said let the inspectors finish their work, you know, do not wage a preemptive war, use diplomacy, were just talking to a brick wall.

But you know, it's clear that if I had been president, we would never have diverted our attention from Afghanistan. 

[....]

CLINTON: So we need a president who will be sensitive to the implications of the use of force and understand that force should be a last resort, not a first resort.

[....]

I believe that it is abundantly clear that the case that was outlined on behalf of going to the resolution -- not going to war, but going to the resolution -- was a credible case. I was told personally by the White House that they would use the resolution to put the inspectors in. I worked with Senator Levin to make sure we gave them all the intelligence so that we would know what's there.

Some people now think that this was a very clear, open-and-shut case. We bombed them for days in 1998 because Saddam Hussein threw out inspectors. We had evidence that they had a lot of bad stuff for a very long time, which we discovered after the first Gulf War.

Knowing that he was a megalomaniac, knowing he would not want to compete for attention with Osama bin Laden, there were legitimate concerns about what he might do.

So I think I made a reasoned judgment.

Unfortunately the person who actually got to execute the policy did not. (Applause.)


 

Link to the full text of  AUMF

(AUMF) - AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ 
From http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107




Text of Hillary's speech in the 2002 AUMF debate

October 10, 2002
Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
on S.J. Res. 45, A Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed
Forces Against Iraq

*As Delivered  (note not as written.)*

Today we are asked whether to give the President of the United States
authority to use force in Iraq should diplomatic efforts fail to dismantle
Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons and his nuclear program.

I am honored to represent nearly 19 million New Yorkers, a thoughtful
democracy of voices and opinions who make themselves heard on the great
issues of our day especially this one. Many have contacted my office about
this resolution, both in support of and in opposition to it, and I am
grateful to all who have expressed an opinion.

I also greatly respect the differing opinions within this body. The debate
they engender will aid our search for a wise, effective policy. Therefore,
on no account should dissent be discouraged or disparaged. It is central to
our freedom and to our progress, for on more than one occasion, history has
proven our great dissenters to be right.

Now, I believe the facts that have brought us to this fateful vote are not
in doubt. Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who has tortured and killed his own
people, even his own family members, to maintain his iron grip on power. He
used chemical weapons on Iraqi Kurds and on Iranians, killing over 20
thousand people. Unfortunately, during the 1980's, while he engaged in such
horrific activity, he enjoyed the support of the American government,
because he had oil and was seen as a counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini
in Iran.

In 1991, Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait, losing the support of
the United States. The first President Bush assembled a global coalition,
including many Arab states, and threw Saddam out after forty-three days of
bombing and a hundred hours of ground operations. The U.S.-led coalition
then withdrew, leaving the Kurds and the Shiites, who had risen against
Saddam Hussein at our urging, to Saddam's revenge.

As a condition for ending the conflict, the United Nations imposed a number
of requirements on Iraq, among them disarmament of all weapons of mass
destruction, stocks used to make such weapons, and laboratories necessary to
do the work. Saddam Hussein agreed, and an inspection system was set up to
ensure compliance. And though he repeatedly lied, delayed, and obstructed
the inspections work, the inspectors found and destroyed far more weapons of
mass destruction capability than were destroyed in the Gulf War, including
thousands of chemical weapons, large volumes of chemical and biological
stocks, a number of missiles and warheads, a major lab equipped to produce
anthrax and other bio-weapons, as well as substantial nuclear facilities.

In 1998, Saddam Hussein pressured the United Nations to lift the sanctions
by threatening to stop all cooperation with the inspectors. In an attempt to
resolve the situation, the UN, unwisely in my view, agreed to put limits on
inspections of designated "sovereign sites" including the so-called
presidential palaces, which in reality were huge compounds well suited to
hold weapons labs, stocks, and records which Saddam Hussein was required by
UN resolution to turn over. When Saddam blocked the inspection process, the
inspectors left. As a result, President Clinton, with the British and
others, ordered an intensive four-day air assault, Operation Desert Fox, on
known and suspected weapons of mass destruction sites and other military
targets.

In 1998, the United States also changed its underlying policy toward Iraq
from containment to regime change and began to examine options to effect
such a change, including support for Iraqi opposition leaders within the
country and abroad.

In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that
Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons
stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also
given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members,
though there is apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible
events of September 11, 2001.

It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue
to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will
keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. Should he succeed in that endeavor,
he could alter the political and security landscape of the Middle East,
which as we know all too well affects American security.

Now this much is undisputed. The open questions are: what should we do about
it? How, when, and with whom?

Some people favor attacking Saddam Hussein now, with any allies we can
muster, in the belief that one more round of weapons inspections would not
produce the required disarmament, and that deposing Saddam would be a
positive good for the Iraqi people and would create the possibility of a
secular democratic state in the Middle East, one which could perhaps move
the entire region toward democratic reform.

This view has appeal to some, because it would assure disarmament; because
it would right old wrongs after our abandonment of the Shiites and Kurds in
1991, and our support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980's when he was using
chemical weapons and terrorizing his people; and because it would give the
Iraqi people a chance to build a future in freedom.

However, this course is fraught with danger. We and our NATO allies did not
depose Mr. Milosevic, who was responsible for more than a quarter of a
million people being killed in the 1990s. Instead, by stopping his
aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo, and keeping on the tough sanctions, we
created the conditions in which his own people threw him out and led to his
being in the dock being tried for war crimes as we speak.

If we were to attack Iraq now, alone or with few allies, it would set a
precedent that could come back to haunt us. In recent days, Russia has
talked of an invasion of Georgia to attack Chechen rebels. India has
mentioned the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan. And what if
China were to perceive a threat from Taiwan?

So Mr. President, for all its appeal, a unilateral attack, while it cannot
be ruled out, on the present facts is not a good option.

Others argue that we should work through the United Nations and should only
resort to force if and when the United Nations Security Council approves it.
This too has great appeal for different reasons. The UN deserves our
support. Whenever possible we should work through it and strengthen it, for
it enables the world to share the risks and burdens of global security and
when it acts, it confers a legitimacy that increases the likelihood of
long-term success. The UN can help lead the world into a new era of global
cooperation and the United States should support that goal.

But there are problems with this approach as well. The United Nations is an
organization that is still growing and maturing. It often lacks the cohesion
to enforce its own mandates. And when Security Council members use the veto,
on occasion, for reasons of narrow-minded interests, it cannot act. In
Kosovo, the Russians did not approve NATO military action because of
political, ethnic, and religious ties to the Serbs. The United States
therefore could not obtain a Security Council resolution in favor of the
action necessary to stop the dislocation and ethnic cleansing of more than a
million Kosovar Albanians. However, most of the world was with us because
there was a genuine emergency with thousands dead and a million driven from
their homes. As soon as the American-led conflict was over, Russia joined
the peacekeeping effort that is still underway.

In the case of Iraq, recent comments indicate that one or two Security
Council members might never approve force against Saddam Hussein until he
has actually used chemical, biological, or God forbid, nuclear weapons.

So, Mr. President, the question is how do we do our best to both defuse the
real threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his people, to the region,
including Israel, to the United States, to the world, and at the same time,
work to maximize our international support and strengthen the United
Nations?

While there is no perfect approach to this thorny dilemma, and while people
of good faith and high intelligence can reach diametrically opposed
conclusions, I believe the best course is to go to the UN for a strong
resolution that scraps the 1998 restrictions on inspections and calls for
complete, unlimited inspections with cooperation expected and demanded from
Iraq. I know that the Administration wants more, including an explicit
authorization to use force, but we may not be able to secure that now,
perhaps even later. But if we get a clear requirement for unfettered
inspections, I believe the authority to use force to enforce that mandate is
inherent in the original 1991 UN resolution, as President Clinton recognized
when he launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

If we get the resolution that President Bush seeks, and if Saddam complies,
disarmament can proceed and the threat can be eliminated. Regime change
will, of course, take longer but we must still work for it, nurturing all
reasonable forces of opposition.

If we get the resolution and Saddam does not comply, then we can attack him
with far more support and legitimacy than we would have otherwise.

If we try and fail to get a resolution that simply, but forcefully, calls
for Saddam's compliance with unlimited inspections, those who oppose even
that will be in an indefensible position. And, we will still have more
support and legitimacy than if we insist now on a resolution that includes
authorizing military action and other requirements giving some nations
superficially legitimate reasons to oppose any Security Council action. They
will say we never wanted a resolution at all and that we only support the
United Nations when it does exactly what we want.

I believe international support and legitimacy are crucial. After shots are
fired and bombs are dropped, not all consequences are predictable. While the
military outcome is not in doubt, should we put troops on the ground, there
is still the matter of Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical weapons.
Today he has maximum incentive not to use them or give them away. If he did
either, the world would demand his immediate removal. Once the battle is
joined, however, with the outcome certain, he will have maximum incentive to
use weapons of mass destruction and to give what he can't use to terrorists
who can torment us with them long after he is gone. We cannot be paralyzed
by this possibility, but we would be foolish to ignore it. And according to
recent reports, the CIA agrees with this analysis. A world united in sharing
the risk at least would make this occurrence less likely and more bearable
and would be far more likely to share with us the considerable burden of
rebuilding a secure and peaceful post-Saddam Iraq.

President Bush's speech in Cincinnati and the changes in policy that have
come forth since the Administration began broaching this issue some weeks
ago have made my vote easier. Even though the resolution before the Senate
is not as strong as I would like in requiring the diplomatic route first and
placing highest priority on a simple, clear requirement for unlimited
inspections, I will take the President at his word that he will try hard to
pass a UN resolution and will seek to avoid war, if at all possible.

Because bipartisan support for this resolution makes success in the United
Nations more likely, and therefore, war less likely, and because a good
faith effort by the United States, even if it fails, will bring more allies
and legitimacy to our cause, I have concluded, after careful and serious
consideration, that a vote for the resolution best serves the security of
our nation. If we were to defeat this resolution or pass it with only a few
Democrats, I am concerned that those who want to pretend this problem will
go way with delay will oppose any UN resolution calling for unrestricted
inspections.

This is a very difficult vote. This is probably the hardest decision I have
ever had to make — any vote that may lead to war should be hard — but I cast
it with conviction.

And perhaps my decision is influenced by my eight years of experience on the
other end of Pennsylvania Avenue in the White House watching my husband deal
with serious challenges to our nation. I want this President, or any future
President, to be in the strongest possible position to lead our country in
the United Nations or in war. Secondly, I want to insure that Saddam Hussein
makes no mistake about our national unity and for our support for the
President's efforts to wage America's war against terrorists and weapons of
mass destruction. And thirdly, I want the men and women in our Armed Forces
to know that if they should be called upon to act against Iraq, our country
will stand resolutely behind them.

My vote is not, however, a vote for any new doctrine of pre-emption, or for
uni-lateralism, or for the arrogance of American power or purpose — all of
which carry grave dangers for our nation, for the rule of international law
and for the peace and security of people throughout the world.

Over eleven years have passed since the UN called on Saddam Hussein to rid
himself of weapons of mass destruction as a condition of returning to the
world community. Time and time again he has frustrated and denied these
conditions. This matter cannot be left hanging forever with consequences we
would all live to regret. War can yet be avoided, but our responsibility to
global security and to the integrity of United Nations resolutions
protecting it cannot. I urge the President to spare no effort to secure a
clear, unambiguous demand by the United Nations for unlimited inspections.

*And finally, on another personal note, I come to this decision from the
perspective of a Senator from New York who has seen all too closely the
consequences of last year's terrible attacks on our nation. In balancing the
risks of action versus inaction, I think New Yorkers who have gone through
the fires of hell may be more attuned to the risk of not acting. I know that
I am.*

*So it is with conviction that I support this resolution as being in the
best interests of our nation. A vote for it is not a vote to rush to war; it
is a vote that puts awesome responsibility in the hands of our President and
we say to him - use these powers wisely and as a last resort. And it is a
vote that says clearly to Saddam Hussein - this is your last chance - disarm
or be disarmed.*

Thank you, Mr. President.

clinton.senate.gov <http://clinton.senate.gov /speeches/iraq_101002.html>



 

Hillary also wanted to limit the power in the AUMF

I rise to join my colleague and friend, Senator Byrd, to announce our intention to introduce legislation which proposes that October 11, 2007 -- the five year anniversary of the original resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq -- as the expiration date for that resolution.

As Senator Byrd pointed out, the October 11, 2002, authorization to use force has run its course, and it is time to reverse the failed policies of President Bush and to end this war as soon as possible.

I supported the Byrd amendment on October 10, 2002, which would have limited the original authorization to one year

Levin Amendment–that is why she went into it.


Long overview -- from David Brooks' article

http://www.hillaryclinton.com/news/article/view/?id=1336 
No Apology Needed
New York Times

David Brooks

Far be it from me to get in the middle of a liberal purge, but would anybody mind if I pointed out that the calls for Hillary Clinton to apologize for her support of the Iraq war are almost entirely bogus?

I mean, have the people calling for her apology actually read the speeches she delivered before the war? Have they read her remarks during the war resolution debate, when she specifically rejected a pre-emptive, unilateral attack on Saddam? Did they read the passages in which she called for a longer U.N. inspections regime and declared, "I believe international support and legitimacy are crucial"?

If they went back and read what Senator Clinton was saying before the war, they'd be surprised, as I was, by her approach. And they'd learn something, as I did, about what kind of president she would make.

The Iraq war debate began in earnest in September 2002. At that point Clinton was saying in public what Colin Powell was saying in private: emphasizing the need to work through the U.N. and build a broad coalition to enforce inspections.

She delivered her Senate resolution speech on Oct. 10. It was Clintonian in character. On the one hand, she rejected the Bush policy of pre-emptive war. On the other hand, she also rejected the view that the international community "should only resort to force if and when the United Nations Security Council approves it." Drawing on the lessons of Bosnia, she said sometimes the world had to act, even if the big powers couldn't agree.

She sought a third way: more U.N. resolutions, more inspections, more diplomacy, with the threat of force reserved as a last resort. She was triangulating, but the Senate resolution offered her a binary choice. She voted yes in order to give Powell bipartisan leverage at the U.N.

This is how she's always explained that vote, and I confess that until now, I've regarded her explanation as a transparent political dodge. Didn't everyone know this was a war resolution? But now, having investigated her public comments, I think diplomatic leverage really was on her mind. I also know, from a third person, that she was spending a lot of time with Powell and wanted to help.

On Nov. 8, 2002, the Security Council passed a unanimous resolution threatening Saddam with "serious consequences" if he didn't disarm.

The next crucial period came in March 2003, as the U.S. battled France over the second Security Council resolution. Clinton's argument at this point was that inspections were working and should be given more time. "It is preferable that we do this in a peaceful manner through coercive inspection," she said on March 3, but went on, "At some point we have to be willing to uphold the United Nations resolutions." Then she added, "This is a very delicate balancing act."

On March 17, Bush gave Saddam 48 hours to disarm or face attack. Clinton tried to be critical of the Bush policy while being deferential to the office of the presidency. She clearly had doubts about Bush's timing, but she kept emphasizing that from her time in the White House, she knew how unhelpful it was for senators to be popping off in public on foreign policy.

At one press event in New York, she nodded when Charles Rangel said Bush had failed at the U.N. But when reporters asked Clinton to repeat what Rangel had just said, she bit her tongue. On March 17, as U.S. troops mobilized, she issued her strongest statement in support of the effort.

Clinton's biggest breach with the liberal wing actually opened up later, in the fall of 2003. Most liberals went into full opposition, wanting to see Bush disgraced. Clinton -- while an early critic of the troop levels, the postwar plans and all the rest -- tried to stay constructive. She wanted to see America and Iraq succeed, even if Bush was not disgraced.

When you look back at Clinton's thinking, you don't see a classic war supporter. You see a person who was trying to seek balance between opposing arguments. You also see a person who deferred to the office of the presidency. You see a person who, as president, would be fox to Bush's hedgehog: who would see problems in their complexities rather than in their essentials; who would elevate procedural concerns over philosophical ones; who would postpone decision points for as long as possible; and who would make distinctions few heed.

Today, the liberal wing of the Democratic Party believes that the world, and Hillary Clinton in particular, owes it an apology. If she apologizes, she'll forfeit her integrity. She will be apologizing for being herself.